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ABSTRACT
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) is an impressive piece of
legislation that deserves serious ethical attention, but
much of the commentary on the Act has focussed on its
legal and practical implications rather than the underlying
ethical concepts. This paper examines the approach that
the Act takes to best interests. The Act does not provide
an account of the underlying concept of best interests.
Instead it lists factors that must be considered in
determining best interests, and the Code of Practice to
the Act states that this list is incomplete. This paper
argues that this general approach is correct, contrary to
some accounts of best interests. The checklist includes
items that are unhelpful. Furthermore, neither the Act nor
its Code of Practice provides sufficient guidance to carers
faced with difficult decisions concerning best interests.
This paper suggests ways in which the checklist can be
developed and discusses cases that could be used in an
updated Code of Practice.
‘‘… but answer me this: can man’s interests be
correctly calculated?’’ (Dostoevsky, p 23)1
The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) (2005)2 is an
impressive piece of legislation that deserves serious
ethical attention. We will examine the approach
that the Act takes to best interests. We will argue
that although the general approach is right many
of the details are wrong. We will propose ways in
which the Code of Practice3 could be developed to
correct the current deficiencies and to improve the
ethical quality of decisions made under the Act.
Our clinical focus is on people who lack capacity
because of dementia.
CHOICE, HYPOTHETICAL CHOICE AND BEST
INTERESTS
Discussions of medical decision-making often
promote the idea of a hierarchy. According to this
hierarchy we should give precedence to a person’s
valid choices. If a person cannot make, and has not
made, a valid choice then the decision should be
made on the basis of a hypothetical choice (usually
called substituted judgement). Finally, if neither of
the above two approaches is possible, we should
treat the person in his or her best interests. In box 1
we outline these three approaches to decision-
making together with some distinctions relevant to
each. We will make use of these distinctions as we
discuss the approach of the MCA.
DECISION-MAKING UNDER THE MCA
With regard to adults who lack capacity the MCA
makes explicit a three-step approach to decision-
making:
Step 1
Enable the patient to make a valid choice at the
time the decision needs to be taken if at all
possible, and respect that choice.
Step 2
If the patient lacks capacity and cannot be enabled
to gain capacity then follow the choice that the
patient has expressed in a valid and applicable
advance decision, if one exists.
Step 3
If the patient lacks capacity, and he or she cannot
be enabled to gain capacity, and no valid and
applicable advance decision exists (or can be
found), then the patient should be treated in his
or her best interests.
The MCA, in keeping with most ethical and
conceptual analyses, does not view a person’s valid
choice as necessarily the same as his or her best
interests. A person can be mistaken, for example,
about what is best for him or her; or can make a
valid decision knowing that it is unlikely to be in
his or her best interests.
Neither does the MCA see a valid and applicable
advance decision as a component of best interests
but instead as separate from and as trumping best
interests (step 2). The Act states: ‘‘If P has made an
advance decision which is (a) valid, and (b)
applicable to a treatment, the decision has effect
as if he had made it, and had had capacity to make
it, at the time when the question arises whether
the treatment should be carried out or continued.’’
One point to note at this stage is that the MCA
condenses the three levels in the hierarchy outlined
in box 1 into two levels. Priority is given to valid
choice if possible and to best interests if not. Best
interests under the MCA incorporates both what
we have called hypothetical choice in box 1 (level
2) and what we have called best interests (level 3).
In the remainder of this paper, when we refer to
best interests we use the term in its legal sense.
That is, best interests provide the criteria for
treating a person who lacks capacity and who has
not made a valid choice (through a valid and
applicable advance decision).
BEST INTERESTS WITHIN THE MCA
If a person lacks capacity, and there is no valid and
applicable advance decision, then, according to the
MCA, the patient should normally be treated in his
or her best interests (step 3).
Section 4(6) of the MCA provides a checklist of
factors that must be considered ‘‘as far as is
reasonably ascertainable’’ in determining best
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interests. This is organised into three subsections. It reads:
‘‘(a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in
particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he
had capacity).
‘‘(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his
decision if he had capacity, and
‘‘(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he
were able to do so.’’
The Code of Practice states (section 5.6): ‘‘This checklist is
only the starting point: in many cases, extra factors will need to
be considered.’’ It expands on what these extra factors might be
in two places. In section 5.46 it states that: ‘‘Evidence of a
person’s beliefs and values can be found in things like their:
cultural background; religious beliefs; political convictions; or
past behaviour and habits.’’ In section 5.47 it states that: ‘‘…
the Act requires decision-makers to consider any other factors
the person who lacks capacity would consider if they were able
to do so. This might include the effect of the decision on other
people, obligations to dependants or the duties of a responsible
citizen.’’
The MCA does not define best interests, nor does it provide
an account of what is to be understood by best interests, other
than the above checklist. The Code of Practice confirms that
‘‘The term ‘best interests’ is not actually defined in the Act’’
(section 5.5).
CAN SUBSTITUTED JUDGEMENT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE
LEGAL CONCEPT OF BEST INTERESTS?
The external sense of substituted judgement
McCubbin and Weisstub5 argue that the concept of best
interests necessarily has an underlying meaning or objective.
According to their position the MCA should provide an account
of what is being aimed at in determining best interests. In the
context of discussing decision-making for patients who lack
capacity, they make a useful distinction between an objective
and a procedure. They write that most standards for best
interests ‘‘fail to distinguish between what they aim to do and
how their aims might be operationalised’’ (p 12). An example
that might make this point clear is the workings of a criminal
court. One key objective of the court is to establish whether or
not the person accused committed the crime. In most situations
whether the person committed the crime is a matter of fact
which is either true or false. There is, however, in general, no
straightforward way in which to establish this fact. The court
process provides a procedure for making a decision but this
procedure may get it wrong. The result of the procedure—what
the court decides—does not determine what we mean by
whether the person did or did not commit the crime: it does not
determine the underlying concept.
Given the position of the MCA on advance decisions it is
noteworthy that the MCA so explicitly eschews providing an
objective or definition of best interests. According to the MCA,
if a person lacks capacity then a valid and applicable advance
decision, if one exists, determines what should be done: it must
be followed. If there is no valid and applicable advance decision
it would seem consistent with this position to treat a person
lacking capacity according to the valid and applicable advance
decision he or she would have made had he or she made one
shortly before losing capacity. This is to apply the standard of
what Berghmans6 has called the external sense of substituted
judgement (box 1). Of course if there is no such advance
decision a judgement has to be made as to what its contents
would have been, but it makes sense to say that in determining
how to treat someone who lacks capacity and has no valid and
applicable advance decision we should make a judgement as to
what the person would have put into such an advance decision.
So why does the MCA not define the underlying concept (or
objective) of best interests in terms of the advance decision the
person might have made? There are three reasons for rejecting
this approach. The first, which could be consistent with the
approach of the MCA, is to argue that it is not helpful to try and
judge what the person might have written in an advance
Box 1 A classification of approaches to decision-making
1. Valid choice
(a) Contemporaneous valid choice: A choice (eg, refusal of
treatment) made about a current situation is valid if the person
has capacity, is properly informed and can make the choice
voluntarily and without coercion.
(b) Prior (advance) valid and applicable choice: The person now
lacks the capacity to make the choice but had previously, when
he or she had capacity, made a choice that was valid (see (a)
above) and that is applicable to the current circumstances.
2. Hypothetical choice (substituted judgement)
(a) External sense: The choice that the person would have made
at a time shortly before losing capacity had he or she considered
the current situation. In other words, what the person would have
written or said in a valid and applicable advance decision had he
or she made one shortly before losing capacity.
(b) Internal sense: What the person would now choose were he
or she (magically) to regain capacity for long enough to make a
valid choice.
3. Best interests
The decision that would maximise the person’s wellbeing.
Wellbeing is not necessarily the same as what a person validly
chooses: people may make valid choices that do not maximise
their own wellbeing, for example a choice may be foolish, or it
may be made to benefit another. Various accounts of wellbeing
have been proposed and these have been usefully classified into
three types4 (although the classification is not entirely satisfac-
tory).
(a) Mental state theories: Wellbeing is defined in terms of mental
states. At its simplest (hedonism) it is the view that happiness or
pleasure is the only intrinsic good and unhappiness or pain the
only intrinsic bad. The theory can be enriched (and complicated)
by allowing a greater plurality of states of mind as contributing to
wellbeing, although this raises the problem of which mental
states these should be.
(b) Desire-fulfilment theories: Wellbeing consists in having one’s
desires fulfilled. It is plausible that to maximise a person’s
wellbeing we ought to give him or her what he or she wants. If
desire-fulfilment theories are to provide a reasonable account of
wellbeing, it is necessary to restrict the relevant set of desires. On
one view only those desires pertaining to life as a whole count as
relevant in the analysis of wellbeing. These are desires that relate
to a person’s life plan.
(c) Objective list theories: According to these theories certain
things can be good or bad for a person and can contribute to his
or her wellbeing, whether or not they are desired and whether or
not they lead to a ‘‘pleasurable’’ mental state. Examples of the
kind of thing that have been given as intrinsically good in this way
are engaging in deep personal relationships, rational activity and
the development of one’s abilities. Examples of things that are
bad might include being betrayed, or deceived, or gaining
pleasure from cruelty.
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decision when the evidence on this matter is poor. This reason
could be given in defence of the MCA’s silence on the
underlying meaning of best interests. In our view, however,
this is a weak defence. The more appropriate response to the
problem of lack of evidence would be to give an account of best
interests based on the external sense of substituted judgement
outlined in box 1, and to present the checklist as the procedure
through which to meet this objective, as best one can, even
when the evidence is poor. Using the checklist procedure in
order to make as good a judgement as one can about what the
person would have written in an advance decision is different
from using the checklist in order to judge what is in a person’s
best interests, when the core meaning(s) of best interests is left
to the decision-maker.
A second reason is to argue that in understanding this
definition the notions of valid and applicable are so crucial that
it is not helpful to base the definition (or objective) of best
interests on a putative advance decision without a much more
detailed understanding of these notions. This argument may be
valid but highlights an important problem with the Act’s
position on advance decisions: that practical decisions will
depend critically on the interpretations of the notions of valid
and applicable and many key problems with these interpreta-
tions are not addressed.
The third reason for rejecting a conception of best interests
based on the external sense of substituted judgement is a
rejection of the principle that a valid and applicable advance
decision must always be determinative. This is not consistent
with the MCA of course. There is a substantial literature on the
strengths and weaknesses of advance decisions (Dworkin;7
Treloar;8 Berghmans;9 Biegler et al;10 Widdershoven and
Berghmans;11 12 Fagerlin and Schneider.13) A discussion of this
literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Our point is that
given that the Act does give overriding authority to a valid and
applicable advance decision, best interests might have been
defined in terms of the hypothetical contents of such an
advance decision.
The Code of Practice in explaining why best interests is not
defined in the Act gives a fourth set of reasons. It states simply
(section 5.5): ‘‘This is because so many different types of
decisions and actions are covered by the Act, and so many
different people and circumstances are affected by it.’’ None of
these reasons, however, provides grounds for why no objective,
or aim, could be stated. At most they are reasons for why
operationalising the objective may be complex.
The internal sense of substituted judgement
Whatever one’s views about the role of advance decisions, most
of those writing in this area accept the principle that an adult
with capacity has the right to have a contemporaneous decision
to refuse any treatment (including life-saving treatment)
respected and many jurisdictions uphold it. This raises the
question of whether there is an approach to best interests that
can be developed from this generally accepted principle. One
promising answer is to adopt the internal view of substituted
judgement. According to this view (see box 1) we ask the
hypothetical question: what decision would the person make
now, if he or she were ‘‘magically’’ able to regain capacity long
enough to make a decision, but that apart from regaining
capacity, he or she would remain in exactly the same situation
as he or she is in currently? (see for example Buchanan and
Brock;14 Berghmans;6 Savulescu and Dickenson15) McCubbin
and Weisstub5 argue essentially in favour of the position that
this type of substituted judgement (which they call pure best
interests) should be the core meaning (or objective) of best
interests on the grounds that it is derived from the right of an
adult with capacity to have a contemporaneous decision
respected.
Some people may consider the hypothetical question mean-
ingless with its magical and counterfactual components. In our
view it is not meaningless but it is fatally underspecified.
Consider the following hypothetical case inspired by the
account of Margo16 and the discussions by Dworkin17 and
Dresser:18
Case 1: Mrs K: a person with dementia who enjoys life and
now has a treatable life-threatening illness
Mrs K has moderately severe Alzheimer’s disease, as had her
mother. She cannot recognise her close relatives although she
seems to enjoy their visits. She is cheerful and greets the people
around her. She gives every appearance of enjoying watching TV
programmes she would previously have despised although it is
doubtful whether she can follow the plots. She enjoys wandering
around the garden of the nursing home looking at the flowers.
She enjoys cups of tea and mealtimes.
Mrs K has a severe chest infection. Without treatment she is
expected to deteriorate and die. With intravenous antibiotics she
is likely to be cured.
Mrs K had been a university lecturer. She had always valued
intellectual pursuits. She had often said to her daughter that if
she ever developed Alzheimer’s disease like her mother then she
would like to die.
How can we apply the internal sense of substituted
judgement to the case of Mrs K? In order to do so we must
ask what decision would Mrs K make if she were to regain
capacity (magically). There are, however, a number of issues
that would need to be clarified in trying to answer this
question. For example:
1. Does Mrs K, in this magical scenario, still hold a strong value
regarding intellectual pursuits? We can assume perhaps that this
value no longer means anything to her now that she has
dementia. So the question is, in the magical scenario in which
she regains capacity to weigh up the pros and cons of antibiotic
treatment, does she also regain the capacity to consider the
value about intellectual pursuits? Or, even if she now lacks such
values, does she remember that she once held them?
2. Does the magical scenario allow her to remember and
evaluate the pleasure that she now gets from walking round the
garden or from TV? And how is such evaluation to be made?
Her former self would not have got pleasure from the TV
programmes she now enjoys. In this magical scenario does she
not only regain capacity but also her previous negative
evaluation of the programmes, or does she maintain the positive
attitude towards the TV programmes?
Our answers to these questions cannot be determined by
looking more deeply into the concept of substituted judgement.
Instead we must first decide the extent and way in which we
take into account the various issues such as her previously held
values and her current pleasures. In deciding what is the right
thing to do when a person lacks capacity, the concept of the
person’s own hypothetical choice understood in the internal
sense (2b in box 1) is insufficient.
CONCEPTS OF BEST INTERESTS BASED ON DESIRE-
FULFILMENT
Having rejected substituted judgement as a basis we turn now
to various other conceptions of best interests (see box 1).
Can we perhaps salvage some of the principle of respecting
capacitous choice by respecting not so much present choice, as
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present desires? These are not the same, of course, but they are
closely related particularly when we have someone with
compromised capacity. There are two different approaches to
understanding present desires: a dispositional account and a
straightforward account in terms of current actual desires.
Savulescu and Dickenson15 argue that a dispositional account of
desires can help in considering people who lack capacity. On
this account both past behaviour (and views) as well as
predicted future behaviour can be evidence for present disposi-
tions to act. Savulescu and Dickenson15 write however: ‘‘The
capacity to have (dispositionsal) preferences is lost when the
relevant disposition to act is permanently lost. The concept of a
present desire based on a dispositional account collapses in
situations such as dementia when a person is unlikely to regain
capacity to express valid choices.’’
Another approach is to give at least considerable weight to
the actual current desires and choices of the person even though
he or she lacks the current capacity to make a valid choice.
Consider the following situation. A person with dementia has
considerable cognitive impairment even lacking the linguistic
ability to express choices through words. Such a person may
nevertheless make choices through behaviour. The person might
for example choose some foods and not others when the foods
are laid out buffet style. Or the person may of his or her own
volition go out into the garden and sit at what seems to be his or
her favourite seat. Some of these behavioural choices may not
be in his or her longer-term best interests: perhaps, for example,
he or she sits in the garden on a wet day, inadequately clothed.
A person with dementia may fail tests of capacity for almost
any decision and yet may have wishes and desires and be able to
express these, if not verbally then behaviourally. It would be in
keeping with the value of respecting capacitous choices to give
at least some weight to such desires. If our concept of best
interests is primarily in terms of the mental state, or the desire-
fulfilment, approaches (see box 1) then one might say that there
are situations when we should allow the person with dementia
to do what he or she wishes or desires even though he or she
lacks capacity with regard to the issue at stake. Two points
should be noted. First we may not be happy to allow the person
to behave in a seriously foolish or reckless manner. Should the
person be allowed to choose light clothing and to sit on his or
her favourite bench in the rain? Second, if we include in our
account of best interests elements from the desire-fulfilment
approach then the extent to which Holm19 and others want to
enable people with dementia the freedom to follow their wishes
and desires might be captured not by contrasting this with best
interests but by seeing this as part of a richer concept of best
interests (Jaworska;20 Hughes;21 Dresser and Whitehouse22).
BALANCING COMPONENTS OF BEST INTERESTS
We have rejected various approaches to providing a single
underlying concept (or aim, or objective) to the notion of best
interests. The external sense of substituted judgement, although
coherent, faces the problem of how to interpret the validity and
applicability of the advance decision. This problem raises the
ethical difficulties that have been widely discussed with regard
to advance decisions. The internal sense of substituted judge-
ment is fatally underdetermined. Basing best interests exclu-
sively on the idea of desire-fulfilment, whether current desires
or on a dispositional account seems inadequate, although desire-
fulfilment might be one component of best interests. For these
reasons we believe that McCubbin and Weisstub5 are wrong in
insisting that the concept of best interests necessarily has an
underlying meaning or objective? We agree with writers such as
Kopelman23 and Holm,19 who not only see judgements about
best interests as properly based on several types of evidence, but
also see the concepts themselves as being made from a mixture
of components. Many factors should be considered in coming to
a decision about best interests, and no satisfactory account of
best interests can be given separate from how the concept is
operationalised.
So how should best interests be determined? Judgements need
to be made as to how much weight to give to previous values and
views, and how much to current views, wishes, desires and
experiences of pleasure and pain. It is implausible to solve these
problems by giving dominant weight to one consideration only.
The relative weight that we should put on each consideration
depends, we believe, on various details of the situation and no
general answer can be given as to what should take precedence
(see Holm).19 Consider the following hypothetical cases:
Case 2: Macho man gets Alzheimer’s disease
Mr L prides himself on his machismo. He plays dangerous sports.
He considers people who are worried about danger, or pain, as
wimps. When he goes to the dentist he refuses any analgesia. He
prides himself on being able to withstand pain. Mr L would not
want any analgesia for pain relief even if he had dementia.
Mr L has Alzheimer’s disease. He develops dental caries for which
treatment is straightforward but involves drilling that without
analgesia would be very painful. Without dental work the teeth
will rapidly deteriorate and will then cause Mr L a great deal of
pain as well as preventing him from eating. The dentist tries to
respect Mr L’s previous values but every time he starts drilling
near the nerve endings Mr L screams with pain. The dentist has
an apparatus that would hold Mr L’s head and jaw secure to
allow him carry out the work without analgesia. The dentist, not
surprisingly, is reluctant to do this.
This case, developed from remarks by Dresser18 and Kuhse24
and on a case in Hope,25 challenges the view that previous values
(or critical interests)17 should always be respected. But previous
values do have some weight:
Case 3(a): Religious objection to eating pork (see Holm,19
note 9)
Mrs M has been, for most of her life, a member of a religious
group that does not eat pork. Mrs M develops Alzheimer’s disease
and lives in a nursing home. For breakfast many of the residents
have an English breakfast consisting of bacon and eggs. The staff,
knowing of Mrs M’s previous religious views, do not give her
bacon. Mrs M is attracted by the smell of cooking bacon. One
day, before the staff can stop her Mrs M takes a piece of bacon
from the plate of another resident and eats it with obvious relish.
After this she tries to take bacon from residents’ plates each
breakfast.
Should the staff stop her from doing this? and now consider
this further development:
Case 3(b)
Mrs M has taken a piece of bacon from another resident’s plate.
She is just putting it into her mouth when a member of staff who
is standing nearby notices. This member of staff quickly grabs
Mrs M’s arm, forces her mouth open and removes the piece of
bacon before Mrs M can swallow it.
Was this the right thing to do? and, finally, what should Mr
N’s daughter do in the following situation?:
Case 4: The vegetarian with dementia
Mr N has been a committed vegetarian for most of his adult life.
He develops Alzheimer’s disease. He lives with his daughter who
is not vegetarian. She provides him with vegetarian food, but it
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becomes clear that Mr N is raiding her fridge and eating the
processed meats and when his daughter catches him eating meat
he is doing so with obvious pleasure.
It does seem right to try and enable a person, who on religious
or moral grounds objects to eating meat, to continue to abstain
even when he or she no longer has the understanding or control.
It is right to provide alternative food to such a person and to
take straightforward measures to prevent him or her from
eating meat once he or she has dementia. However, snatching
the food out of the mouth, an action that will be experienced as
an unprovoked and senseless physical assault, seems to us to be
going too far. The person’s current experiences and current
understanding make a difference, and may provide sufficient
grounds for overriding respect for previous values (or decisions).
This series of cases demonstrates, we believe, that the relative
weights to be given to previous values and current interests
depend on several factors. These include: what would need to be
done in order to respect previous values; the strength of those
previous values; the effect of respect for previous values on the
person’s current wellbeing (for example on current mental
state—see box 1) and current wishes and desires. One issue that
these case examples raise is whether the nature of the previous
views is in itself relevant to the question of how much weight
they are given.
Compare Mr N (case 4 above) with Mrs K (case 1). Mr N had
a moral objection to eating meat. He believed, let us suppose,
that the killing of animals for food is a serious moral wrong. He
believed it was wrong not only for himself but also for others.
Had he discussed the scenario in case 4 at a time when he still
had capacity he would have said that for the sake of the
animals, he would want to be prevented from eating meat.
Mrs K’s values regarding intellectual activities are not
primarily moral values. If, when she has dementia she watches
TV soaps and enjoys them, she would not, according to her
previous views, be harming anyone or anything. It is simply
that she does not wish to be the kind of person who enjoys
these pursuits. Should we give more weight to respecting Mr
N’s vegetarianism than Mrs K’s values on the grounds that Mr
N’s views are moral in nature? We can find no good grounds on
the basis of best interests for giving more weight to the previous
views of a person purely because those views are moral views.
The strength of those previous views and the degree of
importance to the person of respecting them is relevant.
Perhaps on the whole most of us would feel more strongly
that our moral views should be respected even if we no longer
understand them, than that our aesthetic views are respected.
However, it is the strength rather than the nature of the
previous views that is, we believe, the key point.
DEVELOPING THE CHECKLIST FOR BEST INTERESTS IN THE
MCA CODE OF PRACTICE
Subsections (b) and (c) of the MCA best interests checklist (see
above) suggest that in deciding about best interests we should
consider what hypothetical choice (substituted judgement), in
the internal sense (see box 1), the person might make. The Code
of Practice supports this suggestion (eg, section 5.18): ‘‘When
trying to work out someone’s best interests, the decision-maker
should try to identify all the issues that would be most relevant
to the individual who lacks capacity and to the particular
decision, as well as those in the ‘checklist’’’. These two
subsections, and the Code of Practice statement have the
problems in interpreting hypothetical choice that we have
discussed above. We have argued that the key ethical decisions
need to be made before we can apply the test of hypothetical
choice because there is no a priori answer to the question of
what state we imagine the person to be in ‘‘if he had capacity’’,
or ‘‘if he were able to do so’’, or ‘‘would be most relevant to the
individual’’.
It is therefore only subsection (a), ‘‘the person’s past and
present wishes and feelings’’ that provides, in our view, any
valuable guidance in judging the best interests of a person who
lacks capacity. The Code of Practice, however, usefully
emphasises that the approach to gaining evidence about best
interests should be as comprehensive as is reasonable, for
example in stressing the need to consider all circumstances that
might be relevant (eg, section 5.13) and the need to consult
widely (eg, sections 5.49 and 5.53).
The Code of Practice makes it clear that the best interests’
checklist is incomplete. This provides an opportunity for
developing the Code of Practice to expand the checklist beyond
what it states in sections 5.46 and 5.47 (see above) and provide
guidance for practitioners with regard to the ambiguities
inherent in the wording of the Act.
On the basis of the arguments presented in this paper, we
propose the following expanded checklist as both more
complete and as providing more clarity than the current list.
1. The person’s wishes when he or she had capacity.
2. The person’s values when he or she had capacity.
3. The strength with which he or she held these wishes and
values.
4. His or her current wishes.
(It is important not to assume that just because the person
lacks capacity, he or she lacks any relevant wishes. For example,
Macho Man (case 2) might currently wish to have analgesia
even if he is not capable of taking his previous values into
account or even understanding that an offered injection will
reduce his pain.)
5. His or her current values, including current lack of
understanding or awareness of previous values.
6. The strength with which he or she holds these wishes and
values.
7. The person’s current, and likely future, experiences (eg, of
pleasure and pain).
8. The nature of what we have to do in order to follow the
previous wishes and the likely impact of that on the
person’s current and future experiences (see cases 3(a) and
3(b) above).
Finally,
9. In making the judgement as to how much weight to give
each of these considerations it is important to take account
of the degree of evidence for each consideration. As the
Code of Practice makes clear (section 5.40) relevant
evidence includes current behaviour and expressions of
pleasure as well as evidence about past wishes and values.
The Code of Practice could use case examples such as that of
Mrs K (case 1 above) to show how different factors of the
checklist might be used and weighted in coming to a judgement.
CONCLUSION
The approach to best interests in the MCA is flawed in three
ways. First, subsections (b) and (c) of the MCA’s checklist of
best interests ask the decision-maker to use the idea of the
internal sense of hypothetical choice (substituted judgement).
Such hypothetical choice, we have argued, cannot help the
decision-maker because the key judgements must be made in
order to specify the conditions under which the choice is
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imagined. Subsections (b) and (c) thus add nothing of value to
subsection (a). Second, the best interests’ checklist is incomplete
and provides rather little guidance for the decision-maker.
Third, the conceptual relationships between the position the
Act takes on advance decisions and on best interests are
inadequately clarified.
The first flaw is relatively benign although if subsections (b)
and (c) are invoked it can mask what assumptions are being
made in deciding best interests. The second can be addressed
through developing the Code of Practice. We have suggested
ways in which the checklist can be expanded, and cases that
could be used for showing how it should be applied. With regard
to the third issue, we have argued that the position that the Act
takes with regard to advance decisions should impact on the
concept of best interests within the Act. The practical effect of
such impact, however, will remain slight until there is more
clarity about how to decide when an advance decision is valid
and applicable.
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Correction
There was an error in an article published in the October issue of the journal (Cakic V. Smart drugs for
cognitive enhancement: ethical and pragmatic considerations in the era of cosmetic neurology. J Med
Ethics 2009;35:611–15). On p 613 under Performance-enhancing drugs are dangerous, it reads
‘‘Caffeine, for example, reliably increases performance in a range of sports including swimming, cycling
and running at doses allowed by WADA. Yet despite being a form of ‘‘cheating’’ in the same vein as
anabolic steroids, caffeine’s use in sport is permitted because it is relatively harmless.’’ It should read
‘‘Caffeine, for example, reliably increases performance in a range of sports including swimming, cycling
and running. Yet despite being a form of ‘‘cheating’’ in the same vein as anabolic steroids, caffeine’s use
in sport is permitted by WADA because it is relatively harmless.’’
doi: 10.1136/jme.2007.030882corr1
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